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RECENT CASE NOTES
the implication of the majority that every act of an officer requiring the
exercise of judgment upon the matter before him is a judicial function;
and that a ministerial or administrative act is one wherein judgment or
discretion is not exercised. Wilkins v. State, 113 Ind. 514, 16 N. E. 192,
held that under an act requiring a board of examiners to determine whether
or not an applicant to practice dentistry meets the statutory requirements,
while it means that the board in some degree acts judicially, the board
performs no judicial duty within the meaning of the constitution. "An
act is none the less ministerial because the person performing it will have
to satisfy himself that the state of facts exists under which it is his right
and duty to perform the act." Flourney v. Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. 169. The
discretion of a county superintendent to grant or withhold a teacher's
license to an applicant is not an exercise of a judicial function. Elmore
v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548. It is submitted that the superintendent in such
case "adjudges" whether or not the statutory qualifications are met, just
as surely as would the clerk in the instant case. And yet this and similar
exercises of discretion are held purely ministerial acts. The exercise of
such powers as the last preceding, and the powers of the railroad commissions, tax commissions, public service commissions, have been distinguished from judicial powers in that in the latter is involved the power to
determine finally the rights as between adverse parties, by a finding which
will be res judirata unless appealed from. Bergman v. Kearney, (1917)
241 Fed. 884. A further illustration of how far the courts have gone in
recognizing this distinct class of ministerial functions, is the power given
the Secretary of Labor to deport aliens if after a hearing he finds them
to be "undesirable residents of the United States." Mahler v. Eby, 264
U. S. 32, (1924).
As a ministerial function the clerk would properly determine the sufficiency of the petition by employing assistants to help him. State v. Dunn.,
(1925) 118 Kan. 184, 235 Pac. 132. Such would not be a delegation of his
duty under the statute. The clerk would still be the one performing the
act, just as a contractor in erecting a house does not delegate authority
by employing helpers. Both clerk and contractor remain personally responsible. With such assistants, it would seem that the task imposed upon
the clerk under the statute was clearly possible, as contended by the
minority.
It should be noted that the minority makes some good procedural points
in denying that any objection to the act was available to plaintiffs. It has
the support of the cases. 9 R. C. L. 1091; 20 C. J. 181; Parvin W. Wimberg et al., 130 Ind. 561, 130 N. E. 790.
It seems at least questionable whether the court is sound in the points
it makes as to the non-amendability of an unconstitutional law; and the
contention that impossibility of performance for Indianapolis rendered this
law void for lack of uniform operation under Article IV, Section 23, of
J. V. H.
the Constitution of Indiana.
PARENT AND CHILD-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CLAIMED BY DELINQUENT CHmI--By their guardian Amos and Ernest Freestone, both under
16 years of age at the beginning of this action, seek to recover workmen's
compensation for the death of their father, Alonzo, which occurred in the
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course of his employment by appellant. At the time of his death Alonzo
was partially supporting Ernest who was in the custody of his mother
after she had secured a divorce from Alonzo; but he was contributing
nothing to the support of Amos, who a short while before had beer, committed to White's Manual Labor Institute at Wabash as a delinquent. The
Industrial Board awarded compensation to the two sons in unequal parts,
on the theory that each was partially, but not wholly dependent on the
father. In an appeal from these awards the employer contends that Amos
is not entitled to compensation because he was not dependent on his father
at the time the father died, but that the county (LaPorte) was paying for
his support at the Wabash Institute. Held: award as to Amos reversed,
as to Ernest affirmed. Advance Rudey Co. v. Freestone et al., Appellate
Court of Indiana, July 2, 1929, 167 N. E. 377. On rehearing the award
as to Ernest also was reversed and the whole case sent back to the Industrial Board. September 13, 1929, 167 N. E. 633.
By section 38 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended in 1919,
Acts 1919, p. 165, c. 57; section 9483, Burns' Ann. St. 1926, it is conclusively presumed that a child under 18 years of age is wholly dependent
for support upon the parent with whom he is living at the time of the
parent's death, or upon whom the laws of the state impose the obligation
to support such child, although he may not be living with the parent at
the time. After he had been deprived of the custody of his son (Amos),
was the parent under any legal obligation to support him? If a father is
deprived of the custody of his child by order of the court the common law
duty to support ceases, unless otherwise provided for by statute or judicial decree. Creeley v. Creeley, 258 Mass. 460, 155 N. E. 424.
But the statute under which Amos was committed to the manual labor
institute (section 1705, Burns' 1926; Acts 1903, p. 516, c. 237) provides
that if a child. is committed to the care and custody of any institution,
other than a state institution, the court may require the parent to pay in
whole or in part for the support of such child while it is in such institution. In this instance the lower court failed to order the father to pay
any part of Amos' support. This was a judicial determination that he
was relieved of his legal duty to support so long as the decree depriving
him of the custody of his child was in force. And this decree had not
been revoked at the time of the father's death.
Among the cases which follow the reasoning of this decision is Western
Indiana Gravel Co. v. Erwin, Guardian, 84 Ind. App. 26, 149 N. E. 185,
which held that children whose custody was awarded to the mother on
divorce of the parents, and who lived with and were supported by her
without an order of the court requiring the father to support them, were
not dependent so as to be entitled to compensation on the father's death.
It has been held that an insane wife of a workman, cared for at public
expense, is not a dependent entitled to compensation, Roberts v. Whaley,
192 Mich. 133, 158 N. W. 209. "The right to the custody and services of
the child, and the obligation to support and educate, are reciprocal rights
and obligations, unless otherwise fixed by judicial decree." RaIseY v.
Ramsey, 121 Ind. 215, 23 N. E. 69; Husband v. Husband, 67 Ind. 583.
A dissenting opinion contends that when a child is sent to an institution, other than a state institution, although the court fails to order the
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father to contribute anything to its support, the legal obligation to support remains with him unless he is expressly excused from the obligation.
This interpretation of the statute (Burns' 1926, Sec. 1705, supra) is based
on the theory that the legal obligation to support is not shifted until it
is removed by a legal proceeding, Leibold v. Leibold, 158 Ind. 60, 62 N. E.
627; and the fact that he was deprived of his child's custody does not
serve to relieve him of that duty, Spade v. State, 44 Ind. App. 529, 89
N. E. 604. Also, Guthrie v. Conrad, 133 Iowa 171, 110 N. W. 454, which
held that the incarceration of a minor child in a state hospital for the
insane without the father's consent did not relieve him of liability for its
support. The minority opinion further points out that even though the
father was not fulfilling his legal obligation to support at the time of his
death, dependency is established, for the law does not limit dependency of
minor children, living apart from their parents, to cases where support
was being furnished, or contributions made, at time of the workman's
death. It is sufficient if there is a probability of support forthcoming.
Honnold on Workmen's Compensation, Vol. 1, sections 82, 266, Parent and
Child. Most of the cases cited in support of the dissenting opinion were
cited also in the majority opinion, or were held not to be in point because
a statute governed the decision, or for some other reason.
T. W. S.
STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION--GENERAL AND SPECIFIc WoRDs-Defendant
was indicted under section 2740, Burns' Ann. St. 1926, reading in part:
"Any room, house, building, boat, structure, or place of any kind where
intoxicating liquor is sold or people are permitted to resort for drinkingin violation of the law-is a public nuisance." It appeared that the defendant operated an amusement park and that under a legal warrant such
park was raided and during the raid a car leaving the park was stopped
and an occupant threw out a quart bottle of whiskey. The trial court convicted defendant under the above statute. Held: Conviction reversed.
Construing the words in the statute in light of the rule ejusdem generis
the only place which may become a nuisance under section 2740, Burns'
Ann. St. 1926, is a room, house, building, boat, or structure. Chief Eagle
Feather et al. v. State, Appellate Court of Indiana, June 27, 1927, 167
N. E. 147.
Where general words in a statute follow specific words designating special things, the general words are, as a rule, limited to cases of the same
general nature as those which are specified. Wiggins v. State, 172 Ind.
78, State v. Jackson, 168 Ind. 384, Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
section 268, page 351. The doctrine of ejusdem generis is not a rule of
interpretation, but an aid to interpretation when the intention is not otherwise apparent, and does not control where it clearly appears from the
statute as a whole that no such limitation was intended. U. S. Cement Co.
v. Cooper, 17 Ind. 599, Strange v. Board of Commissioners of Grant County,
173 Ind. 640, Pein v. Miznerr, 41 Ind. App. 255.
In this case it is clear the liquor was not found in a room, house, building, boat, or structure, and in the light of the rule ejusdem generis the
"place" had to be of the same genus or kind as house, boat, etc. The
liquor found in the open did not qualify as a "place" designated by the

